Fiscal effects of Social Security reform in the United States

Coile

Courtney

Coile, Courtney

Author

Gruber

Jonathan

Gruber, Jonathan

Author

text

working paper

Chestnut Hill, Mass. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College20032003monographic

Chestnut Hill, Mass.

Center for Retirement Research at Boston College

2003

monographic

Englisheng

English

eng

electronicapplication/pdfborn digital

electronic

application/pdf

born digital

Social Security is the largest social insurance program in the U.S., and has been shown to be a major determinant of the labor supply decisions of older workers. As such, reforming the Social Security system can have two fiscal impacts: a mechanical effect through changing the rules on benefits entitlements or taxation, and a behavioral effect through individual responses to these changes in benefits or taxes. We build a simulation model that computes these effects for major reforms to the system, building on estimated retirement responses to changing net Social Security entitlements. We then estimate the fiscal impact of reform for the 1931-1941 cohort of workers represented by the Health and Retirement Survey. We find that raising the early and normal retirement age by three years would reduce net costs for this cohort by roughly 30%, and that moving to a much higher benefit level would raise net costs by roughly 55%. Importantly, we find that in both cases the behavioral impacts on net costs are relatively small, at most one-third, and generally less than one-fifth of the total. The reason for these small effects is that the U.S. Social Security system is roughly actuarially fair, so that delaying or inducing retirement has relatively little impact on system balances; most of the effects that do arise are due to changes in general income and consumption taxes.

Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber.

CRR WP2003-5

CRR WP

2003-5

http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Working_Papers/wp_2003-05.pdf

MChBEnglisheng

MChB

Englisheng

English

eng