The role of governance in retirement investmentsEvidence from variable annuities

The role of governance in retirement investmentsEvidence from variable annuities

The

role of governance in retirement investments

Evidence from variable annuities

Evans

Richard

Evans, Richard

Author

Author

Fahlenbrach

Rdiger

Fahlenbrach, Rdiger

Author

Author

text

working paper

Chestnut Hill, Mass. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College20072007monographic

Chestnut Hill, Mass.

Chestnut Hill, Mass.

Center for Retirement Research at Boston College

2007

2007

monographic

Englisheng

English

eng

electronicapplication/pdfborn digital

electronic

application/pdf

born digital

We study the relative importance of market governance and non-market governance in retirement investments using a sample of variable annuities. Variable annuity investors are significantly less sensitive to performance and fees than mutual fund investors. Consistent with a complementary role of market and non-market governance, other governance mechanisms play a stronger role for variable annuity funds. Variable annuity sponsors add alternative investment options and replace advisors on behalf of their investors after poor performance and high fees. These other governance mechanisms are ineffective, however, whenever conflicts of interest exist between variable annuity sponsors and fund advisors.

Richard Evans and Rdiger Fahlenbrach.

CRR WP2007-20

CRR WP2007-20

CRR WP

2007-20

http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Working_Papers/wp_2007-20.pdf

MChBEnglisheng

MChB

Englisheng

English

eng