The role of governance in retirement investmentsEvidence from variable annuities
The
role of governance in retirement investments
Evidence from variable annuities
Evans
Richard
Evans, Richard
Author
Author
Fahlenbrach
Rdiger
Fahlenbrach, Rdiger
Author
Author
text
working paper
Chestnut Hill, Mass. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College20072007monographic
Chestnut Hill, Mass.
Chestnut Hill, Mass.
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College
2007
2007
monographic
Englisheng
English
eng
electronicapplication/pdfborn digital
electronic
application/pdf
born digital
We study the relative importance of market governance and non-market governance in retirement investments using a sample of variable annuities. Variable annuity investors are significantly less sensitive to performance and fees than mutual fund investors. Consistent with a complementary role of market and non-market governance, other governance mechanisms play a stronger role for variable annuity funds. Variable annuity sponsors add alternative investment options and replace advisors on behalf of their investors after poor performance and high fees. These other governance mechanisms are ineffective, however, whenever conflicts of interest exist between variable annuity sponsors and fund advisors.
Richard Evans and Rdiger Fahlenbrach.
CRR WP2007-20
CRR WP2007-20
CRR WP
2007-20
http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Working_Papers/wp_2007-20.pdf
MChBEnglisheng
MChB
Englisheng
English
eng