Young widow(er)s, Social Security, and marriage

Brien

Michael J.

Brien, Michael J.

Author

Dickert-Conlin

Stacy

Dickert-Conlin, Stacy

Author

Weaver

David A.

Weaver, David A.

Author

text

working paper

Chestnut Hill, Mass. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College20032003monographic

Chestnut Hill, Mass.

Center for Retirement Research at Boston College

2003

monographic

Englisheng

English

eng

electronicapplication/pdfborn digital

electronic

application/pdf

born digital

The Social Security program, like the federal income tax system, is not marriage neutral. In the income tax literature, when a couple faces a higher (lower) tax bill as a married couple than as two single individuals, it is said that the couple, in effect, faces a marriage penalty (marriage subsidy). Similarly, provisions in Social Security lead to marriage subsidies or penalties. In this paper, we examine marriage penalties associated with Social Securitys child- in-care benefits. These benefits are paid to widow(er)s who are caring for minor or disabled children. Benefits to the widow(er) terminate upon remarriage, giving rise to marriage penalties. We document the size of these penalties, discuss their likely effects on marriage decisions, and measure the cost of repealing the termination provision.

Michael J. Brien, Stacy Dickert-Conlin, and David A. Weaver.

CRR WP2003-2

CRR WP

2003-2

http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Working_Papers/wp_2003-02.pdf

MChBEnglisheng

MChB

Englisheng

English

eng