Punitive damages are a necessary remedy in broker-customer securities arbitration cases
Punitive damages are a necessary remedy in broker-customer securities arbitration cases
Reder
Margo E. K.
Reder, Margo E. K.
Dept. of Business Law, Carroll School of Management
Author
Author
text
article
1995monographic
1995
monographic
Englisheng
English
eng
electronicapplication/pdfdigitized other analog
electronic
application/pdf
digitized other analog
The two primary legal doctrines in this Article, punitive damages and securities arbitration, each have produced highly publicized close decisions resulting in inconsistent and contentious litigation. The issues raised by this litigation were joined in the case Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., recently decided by the United States Supreme Court. Mastrobuono’s result has enormous financial implications for securities firms and their customers, as well as other industries which arbitrate their disputes.
Securities firms typically require investors to sign a predispute arbitration agreement (PDAA), drafted by their brokers, as a condition to investing. When a dispute arises, it is settled in accordance with previously elected rules, and usually the arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief deemed just and equitable. (Translation: compensatory damages and attorney's fees are available, as are punitive damages, if warranted.) Punitive damages awarded by arbitrators have become a highly publicized lightning rod of sorts, partly due to their perceived frequency and magnitude. The securities industry charges that when arbitration agreements are governed by the law of a state prohibiting punitive damages, state law should control, despite strong federal policy supporting arbitration of all arbitrable claims. Investors, on the other hand, consider punitive damages in arbitration appropriate since punitive damages would frequently have been an available remedy had the case been litigated in court.
Indiana Law Review0090-419829v.1no.105130pp. 105-1301995
Indiana Law Review
Indiana Law Review
0090-4198
29v.1no.105130pp. 105-1301995
29v.
29
v.
1no.
1
no.
105130pp. 105-130
105
130
pp. 105-130
1995
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Business Law
Business Law
MChBEnglisheng
MChB
Englisheng
English
eng